Cazorla said:
When is this book out, will have to give it a read.
It's called Champions League dreams, and discusses some of the tactics he used in Europe, it's interesting. You realise more thought goes in from these managers than you think (or we'd all be managers lol)
Juventus Away 2005 (leading 2-1 from first leg)
At the centre of our plan for our away leg against Juventus in 2005 was Xabi Alonso. He had not played since January 1, spending three arduous months recovering from his broken ankle. We knew, though, that we would need him in Turin.
We had targeted this game for his return as soon as we had progressed against Leverkusen in the previous round. He had slowly, steadily, stepped up his recuperation, but he would still be short of match fitness, more fragile than we would like. We would require a system to protect him.
Rather than play in our usual 4-2-3-1 formation, I decided to switch to three central defenders — Carra [Jamie Carragher], [Sami] Hyypia and [Djimi] Traoré — with Steve Finnan and John-Arne Riise deployed as wing backs. In the middle, Xabi would play deep, with Igor Biscan and Antonio Nuñez acting almost as bodyguards, doing the running that he simply was not fit enough to do.
It was imperative, too, that we did not sit too deep. Even on nights like that, when keeping a clean sheet to protect your 2-1 aggregate lead is all you need to do to ensure qualification, I would never encourage my team to sit back, to drop right to the edge of our box. If you play deep, you will make a mistake. My idea is always, always, to push out, to get the ball as far from our goal as possible.
That was our idea, but we had one more trick up our sleeves.
Instead of instructing the team to line up in our specially-designed formation, I told them to play for the first two minutes in the 4-2-3-1 that Fabio Capello and the rest of Juventus’s coaching staff would probably have been expecting.
Only after the game was underway would we move, organically, into the 3-5-1-1. It is a little trick that, sometimes, managers use. Often, if your opponents see you start the game in a different way to the one they had anticipated, they will react, adapting their own system to counteract yours. That is the manager’s job, of course, to change his approach depending on circumstances.
If you change after a few minutes, it can look more natural. Sometimes, your rivals will not alter a thing.
Barcelona 2007 - leading 2-1 from first leg
Know your opponents When we played Barcelona in 2007, it was not simply a matter of doing anything we could to stop Lionel Messi. We were just as concerned with how to cope with Ronaldinho. The Brazilian played on the left wing, nominally, but would drift inside, occupying space between the lines.
That would create a problem for Steve Finnan, our right back. If he tracked Ronaldinho, he would leave space for Barcelona’s left back, Gianluca Zambrotta, to exploit. The threat of Barcelona’s No 10, though, was more important. I instructed Finnan to follow his man, to push him, not to allow him a moment to play the sort of penetrating pass which could cut a defence apart.
On the opposite side, we would play Álvaro Arbeloa, signed as recently as January from Deportivo La Coruña, against Messi. It would be Arbeloa’s first start for Liverpool. His opponent was just a teenager, not yet talked of as one of the finest players in history, but it was still one of the more intimidating debuts in world football.
Arbeloa is not the sort of player to get scared, though, and he was confident he could do what was being asked of him. Besides, a manager does not simply come up with an idea and then tell his players about it an hour or so before the game. In Portugal, and upon our return to Melwood, we worked extensively on what we hoped Arbeloa would do.
The principle was relatively simple. Messi, playing wide on the right, favoured cutting inside on his left foot. By playing Arbeloa, naturally right footed, at left back, we would be able to prevent him embarking on those dangerous, slaloming runs. Arbeloa would have to stick close to his man, too, not allowing him to breathe. If Messi has time to turn, he can inflict substantial damage. We had to be on top of him all the time.
We drilled our new, makeshift left back extensively in the days before the game. We prepared DVDs for him so he knew Messi’s movements. In training, we played him at left back, against a left-footed player, to get him used to the job he would have to do in Barcelona.
And we prepared the rest of the team, particularly our defenders, not to use Arbeloa too much when we had possession. The danger of playing a right-footed full back at left back is that he has to turn his body inside to play the ball, which cuts off his options and slows down counter-attacks. It was crucial we did not give him too much of the ball.
The dangers of team-building In the stands, Steven Gerrard had his hands raised to his head and a look of horror on his face. Beneath him, Dirk Kuyt was catching his breath, trying to stumble to his feet. Peter Crouch was careering round at high speed and with no way of stopping. It was a week before the 2007 Champions League final, and our centre forward had just come within a whisker of running his strike partner over.